

Ways of Representing Synesthesia in a Verbal Text

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Abstract: The question of distinguishing between multimodality and synesthesia has not been problematized so far, as it seemed to be self-evident. The aim of this article is to distinguish between these two phenomena from a psychophysiological point of view, and to show that each of them requires different semiotic means, as well as different methods of working with them, for their representation in a verbal text. In addition, the symbolization of multimodal experience is discussed separately on the basis of French Symbolist poetry (Ch. Baudelaire and A. Rimbaud), since the phenomenon of “correspondences” turns out to be the key to the construction of the so-called “philosophical symbol”, which determines the specificity of the “new” poetic text for that epoch.

Keywords: synesthesia, multimodal reception, stream of consciousness, French symbolism.

Introduction

Since the end of the 19th century, research has been quite actively conducted on the nature of the psychoneurological phenomenon, synesthesia, which is a specific feature of “feeling” the world through mixing different modes of stimulus effect (for example, when sounds are colored or colors smell). Synesthesia is studied in the context of a variety of sciences – physiology, psychophysiology, psychology, medicine, psycholinguistics, literary studies, etc. The general trend of research can be considered as a distinguishing between two types of this phenomenon: the first is exclusively biologically conditioned, the second can be called partly artistic (implying either cultural influence or artistic thinking component). However, even if the difference between these two types is realized, it is often not taken into account, especially in the humanitarian science, which gives rise to quite considerable confusion in terminology. If we characterize the terminological situation in brief, then the following terms should be distinguished: true- and pseudo-synesthesia proposed by American scientists, primarily in the works of S. Day (Day, 2000), personal and creative synesthesia proposed by Dutch scholar H. Hayrman (Hayrman, 2005). It is also noteworthy to mention the type of synesthesia proposed by the Russian scholar S. Voronin (Voronin, 2006), which involves the crossing of the sound perception modality and meaning perception modality (phonosemantic nature of synesthesia).

The question of distinguishing between multimodality and synesthesia has not been specifically and purposefully problematised before. This is because it was previously assumed to be self-evident, given that human stimulus effect (including normative stimulus effect) of the world is inevitably multimodal. Moreover, the closely related issue of the multimodal and synesthetic images representation in a verbal text was not addressed. Any atypical sensory metaphor was classified as synesthetic (Day, 1996; Callejas, 2001; Smirnova, 2016), irrespective of whether the sensations underlying it were physiologically accurate or not. The aim of this paper is to put forward a potential solution to the aforementioned issues, with a particular focus on the significance of multimodal and synesthetic images. While the psychophysiological aspect will be addressed, it will serve merely as a preliminary point for subsequent considerations. As will be discussed subsequently, the distinction between multimodality and synesthesia requires a

differentiation between the types of significance required for the accurate representation of multimodal and synesthetic stimulus effect in verbal text.

This paper employs the poetry of A. Rimbaud as illustrative material for a potential variant of the multimodal image representation in an artistic (poetic) text. This enables us to interpret the multimodal sensory images as representations of the “new” artistry – French symbolism – which functions with the word not merely as a medium of expression, but as a means of accessing the essence of the visible world, as evidenced in the images of 'correspondences'.

1. Synesthesia or multimodality?

The distinction between multimodality and synesthesia may initially appear inconsequential, given that these terms share a similar etymological root, denoting the blending or integration of sensory modalities. This apparent overlap suggests that they may refer to the same underlying phenomenon. This is, to some extent, accurate; however, it is evident that the nature of synesthesia is somewhat heterogeneous. On the one hand, it can be classified as absolute personal knowledge, which, even if fixed in language categories, remains indescribable, at least due to the fact that such perception is atypical. Conversely, as B. Galeev (Galeev, 1995) aptly observed, language is replete with synesthetic metaphors, which, due to their cultural fixity, are readily comprehensible. To illustrate, one might cite a warm colour or a low voice, for example. Such metaphors can be explained by the imperfections of natural languages, which have a limited lexical stock for describing certain modalities and therefore have to replenish this stock by borrowing vocabulary used to describe other modalities. However, this explanation is a significant oversimplification of the issue. Firstly, it is not a comprehensive account (it only partially elucidates the situation and is characteristic only of some modalities; the Russian language, for instance, has an extremely limited vocabulary describing odours). Secondly, in numerous European languages (chiefly French, English, German and Russian), the figurative basis of synesthetic metaphors is repeated (e.g. “теплый цвет/warm colour/couleur chaude/warme Farbe”). Nevertheless, it is questionable whether these metaphors can be defined as synesthetic. It is challenging to assert that the nature of the images “A black/ A noir” (Rimbaud, 1972), “ringing blue hour/ звонко-синий час” (Blok, 1980) and “warm colour” are

identical. An attempt to answer such questions necessitates an investigation into psychophysiology and comparative cultural studies.

1.1.The phenomenon of synesthesia

In the context of the problem in question, it is possible to distinguish synesthesia as a phenomenon that is represented (like other types of stimulus effect) by three consecutive stages: reception (sensation), perception and apperception. Reception is the stage of signal registration by nerve cells-receptors, during which the energy of an external stimulus is transformed into a nerve impulse, giving rise, for example, to tactile sensations. Physiologically adequate sensations are a somatic reaction to the irritation of several cells at once and are the generation of a certain “bundle” of nerve impulses. In the case of synesthesia, however, the receptor will initiate, in addition to the “bundle” of physiologically adequate nerve impulses, also a “bundle” of physiologically inadequate nerve impulses what may be called synesthetic sensation, in which irritation of receptors of one type (i.e., responsible for one modality of perception) provokes sensations from receptors of another type. This process is so rapid that the sensations are perceived by the recipient as “simultaneous” (this allows us to speak of a “single” synesthetic sensation).

The stage of perception can be defined as the process of categorizing sensations (and in the case of synesthesia, synesthetic sensations) that arise during the stage of reception. The result of individual categorization is the formation of a perceptual image of the stimulus, which subsequently becomes the object of attention, memory and thinking (apperception). To some extent, the perceptual image can be likened to an as yet undeveloped, invariant “rule” that is already in the form of a content plan, allowing for verbal representation. Perception plays a role in the formation of a nascent, albeit not fully conscious, recognition that enables the future naming of sensations. The psychophysiological basis for the formation of the concept, as considered in cognitive linguistics, is established at the stage of perception.

The apperception stage represents the final stage of the sensory system work. This stage is characterized by the “culturalization” of sensory experience. The formed perceptual image is realized in the context of the recipient's cultural, linguistic and personal experience, which inform and influence the interpretation of the image. Cultural experience compels the recipient to

adapt their sensory experience – during its formulation in linguistic categories – to culturally established ideas. This inevitably introduces culturally determined “connotations” (co-meanings can be correlated with “co-sensations”; the last one encompasses not only individual synesthetic “sensations”, which are physiologically inadequate, but also additional physiologically adequate and culturally normative sensations – multimodal sensations, which constitute the overwhelming majority of the sensory experience).

Synesthesia, in its proper sense, is an organic phenomenon resulting from a physiologically inadequate stimulus effect. It comprises not only sensations that are adequate to the stimulus, but also inadequate sensations. These may be correlated with either the stage of reception, the stage of perception, or both stages, or with the transition from one stage to another. The results of laboratory studies of this problem have been inconclusive (Hubbard, Ramachandran, 2005). It is important to note that the transition to the stage of apperception results in a change of the purely physiological nature of synesthesia. This change manifests as a “culturalized”, as its presentation as multimodal image, similar to the one formed during physiologically adequate multimodal stimulus effect. Therefore, synesthesia culminates in the formation of a specific multimodal image or concept, as defined by cognitive linguists (i.e., an image that has lost its definiteness and concrete referentiality; a concept that serves as a “substitute” for the concrete quality of the apperceptive image). The individual synesthetic sensation is found to be mixed with what has been thought and with what has been realized in the cultural categories. This brings it closer to synesthesia, which can be interpreted both as a kind of multimodal stimulus effect and as a specific form of synesthesia (Voronin, 2006). However, the concreteness of the categorised image, which can be considered a kind of pre-logical operation, has been replaced by a “general representation”.

This concept as a meaning of a sentence that represents verbally a sensory experience is characterized by a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a highly personal construct, forming an integral part of one's personal knowledge. On the other hand, it possesses a certain degree of commonality, enabling the identification of an external, tangible reality. The implicit commonality inherent in the concept enables the final sign to generate diversity and metaphorically. Consequently, the nature of synesthetic 'vision' seems to be obscured, transformed into a kind of “biological metaphor” which, with a certain organization of the text, can acquire aesthetic status. Synesthesia at the stage of apperception gives rise to a multimodal

image (subsequently losing its “referentiality” and becoming a concept), which is indistinguishable from the image that would arise from physiologically adequate multimodal stimulus effect. However, initially, the nature of synesthetic sensations may differ from that of multimodal ones.

The aforementioned homonymy of the final apperceptive images allows us to posit the disparate sources of multimodality, which are founded upon both physiologically adequate and inadequate sensations:

1. synesthesia considered as physiologically inadequate stimulus effect;
2. individual multimodal stimulus effect (physiologically adequate);
3. individual multimodal stimulus effect (physiologically inadequate; e. g., a blow to the eye as a flash of light or a bright light as a mechanical blow);
4. cultural multimodal stimulus effect (physiologically adequate);
5. cultural multimodal stimulus effect (physiologically inadequate; e.g., when linguistic constructions contradict actually experienced, physiologically adequate sensory experience: *cedar, pine, laurel*).
6. monomodal stimulus effect (multimodality is a result of using linguistic cliches: warm color, low voice, etc.).

The final image may be based on each type of stimulus effect separately, may combine them harmoniously or disharmoniously, and may also be in contradiction with each other. In such cases, the contradiction of the image may be perceived by both the synesthete who generated the image and the individual who perceives the final image, whether they are a synesthete or a non-synesthete.

The focus of this paper is the question of whether it is possible to construct a synesthetic image defined as an image based on physiologically inadequate synesthetic sensations that have not been subjected to cultural processing. In other words, it is the question of whether it is possible to create a verbal image that captures the stimulus effect process at the stage of reception and/or perception without moving to the stage of apperception. It is also the problem of creating a multimodal image, that is to say, a verbal image based on physiologically inadequate synesthetic sensations, but at the same time having undergone cultural “processing” at the stage

of apperception. In this context, language (or, more precisely, a verbal text) is regarded as a means of articulating and portraying the apperception of synesthetic experiences in the case of multimodal images. It is also seen as a potential means of fixing the reception (perception) of a synesthetic image in circumstances where it can be verbally registered.

1.2.Ways of representing synesthesia in verbal text

The question arises as to how the synesthete himself can verbally express his synesthetic experience (receptive and/or perceptual) in the most adequate way for himself, so that the most “authentic” names of his experiences are found. This question can only be posed if the synesthete is aware of their synesthesia, its atypical nature and wishes to express their experience in some way. Otherwise, the final image (if it is not shocking in its atypicality) will be homonymous with the multimodal one. Two issues emerge when attempting to consciously express synesthesia. Firstly, verbalizing a sensory experience requires reflexivity from the synesthete, which will inevitably result in semiotic means being adjusted to align with culturally normative applications. Secondly, introspection of synesthesia is not sufficiently “conscious”, which results in the inadequate use of semiotic means.

In this context, it is crucial to differentiate between the notions of reflection and introspection. Reflection is the act of directing one’s consciousness towards the self. It is a logical process of self-description that employs the full range of notion tools, including notions, subject-predicate relations, and even cause-effect relations. In contrast, introspection is a fleeting glimpse of the “I”, a momentary observation that is devoid of the logical tools and standards that are typically employed in reflection. It can be seen as a kind of naive engagement with the self through sensory experience. In the case of verbalizing synesthesia, the method of self-observation must combine naivety with point awareness. This involves a certain “deliberate absence of intentionality” with logical certainty as the ability to operate with signs. Intentionality can be defined as a concentration on the concrete experience of sensation, whereas epoch can be defined as an attitude of consciousness seeking to get rid of illusions. This is a point of view on the experience that does not assert anything, but at the same time is ready for future full-fledged thought processing (this is the operation with concepts as “products” of perception, which do not lose their referentiality; the perceptual image, considered as a certain “pre-concept”, retains its

referentiality due to the fact that it is in an immanent relationship with the referent, it is inseparable from it, whereas the apperceptual image, which generates the concept, is connected with the referent by transcendental relations: the referent, revealed to the recipient “primary” as a phenomenon of his perception, turns out to be “forgotten”; the psychic displaces the physiological).

In relation to these problems, we are faced with the task of finding those semiotic means (such as the organization of a verbal or other text) that would register not certain acts of consciousness, but the experience of the body, for which synesthesia is not something abnormal, atypical. It is a question of finding a language (or a signness) that would be an extension of the body, that would help introspection “not to fall into a stupor” when trying to represent sensory experience. Such semiotic means should minimize the role of pattern-fitting introspection in the process of verbalization, i.e. transform the reflection typical of such situations into a kind of phenomenological introspection, but at the same time retain the logical “toolkit” inherent in reflection (the logical toolkit should only “help” in the choice of an adequate semiotic means, but the registration of experience itself should remain entirely spontaneous).

2.1. Stream of consciousness verbalization as indexation of synesthetic sensations.

In the context of representing synesthesia in verbal text, it may be relevant to consider the concept of the “stream of consciousness”. The term “stream of consciousness” is employed in a variety of disciplines, denoting disparate phenomena. A philological interpretation of this term reveals that it denotes a writing technique, fiction, and a technique imitating the processes of the human psyche. This technique builds on the contrast with rhetorically organized speech and is, in fact, possible due to this contrast, i. e. the term in its philological usage names a pseudo-stream of consciousness. A pseudo stream of consciousness differs from a true stream, first of all, not even by the fact that it often turns out to be only an artificial imitation made by the author's intellect (for, e.g., the experience of the Surrealists shows that imitation of a stream of consciousness is not a universal practice, there may be attempts to fix a true stream), but by the fact that the author who tries to fix a pseudo stream of consciousness signally often does not care about the signs of what nature he uses, for his goal is the artistically significant effect of his text (not necessarily verbal). The the stream of consciousness imitation, or pseudo-stream, is

determined by the nature of signs that register the stream. A sign connected with its referent by transcendental relations is inevitably conventional in the way it designates the referent. In contrast, the authentic fixation of stream of consciousness must turn to the process of introspective indexogram consisting of indexical icons. This process “catches” the psyche movement and points to it, “grasping” in indexical icons that are linked to their referents by immanent relations (see: the curves on the second page of the spread in Picasso’s illustrations for Hamlet – Feld, 1965).

The true stream of consciousness is a stream of experienced, possibly non-linear sequence of images arising at the junction of contact with what lies beyond this stream – perceptual phenomena forming a phenomenal contents series. This series turns out to be accessible to the sign account after phenomenological reduction made by non-intellectual non-tension (see: techniques of non-intentional deconcentration – Bakhtiyarov, 2004), if the goal is the accuracy of sign representation. It is evident that the phenomenological reduction may also be a result of intellectual tension but in this case, its outcome will be different: consciousness, understood as a set of Kantian categories, returned “to things themselves”, will “see” the phenomenon verbally, not against the background of language: the phenomenon will turn out to be equal to the word as its conventional designation, i.e., this contemplation will not be a phenomenon contemplation but a word contemplation. In non-intellectual non-tension, however, the result of phenomenological reduction must be the phenomenon itself, felt in its immediacy; it is this immediacy of true feeling that must produce the irreducible, non-conventional index pointing to the phenomenon).

In the case of synesthesia and its verbal representation, the “I” of synesthete purified by phenomenological reduction from the quasi-logical toolkit imposed by culture, is thus prepared to perceive the synesthetic sensation in its intrinsic form (in this case, the synesthesia of the synesthete itself is the phenomenon to which phenomenological reduction is directed), without the admixture of culturally given “connotations” and “co-meanings” that are added to one’s own psychophysiological experience. In contrast, the index functions as a sign that emerges at the intersection of introspective engagement with one’s own psychological experience. It serves as a mere indication, rather than an affirmation. This non-assertion results in the absence of any culturally determined connotations associated with the synesthetic image.

Peirce writes about indices this way: “[...] there are *indications*, or indices; which show something about things, on account of their being physically connected with them [...]. Anything which focuses the attention is an indication. Anything which startles us is an indication, in so far as it marks the junction between two portions of experience” (Peirce, s. a.). In his writings, Peirce posits that the function of an index is to capture attention and indicate one of the potential pathways leading to a particular signified of the index. In the case of synesthesia, the function of the index should be reduced to a strict restriction, namely total unambiguity. This entails that the index should indicate only one path to only one signified. This relationship is reminiscent of an electronic link that can refer to only one possible site (see: Nikanorov, 2021; Rodoman, 1999; Tsvetaeva, 1977). It is our contention that this can be achieved if the final text is an “indexical text”, which outwardly appears incoherent and arbitrary. The absence of grammatical word relations neutralizes the lexical word meaning, thereby allowing for the emergence of its individual, situational meaning. The word becomes as incoherence and wordlessness (see – Feld, 1965).

It can be argued that an unreflected stream of consciousness has the potential to index synesthetic sensations at the stage of reception and/or perception, thereby circumventing the usual language acquisition processes and the formation of apperceptive multimodal images of concepts.

2.2. Multimodal stimulus effect as epithetization of an image

The representation of multimodal experience in a sign system necessitates that the relations within the sign not be wholly existential from semiotic point of view. That is to say, a sign must assert something by combining a core meaning with a set of contextually emergent meanings. Consequently, multimodal experience is expressed through such signs, which Peirce refers to as “symbols, or general signs” (Peirce, s. a.). Furthermore, this representation can also possess a 'collateral' artistic value, as the expression of multiple modalities simultaneously generates cultural and individual connotations within the final verbal image (e.g. Rimbaud's 'golden voice/voix d’or — Rimbaud, 1972).

Furthermore, when verbalizing a multimodal (or synesthetic) image, the subject-predicate relations are forcibly imposed on it, which, in turn, from the linguistic perspective, also turn out to be specific (if not limited to nominative constructions — Chebanov, Martynenko, 1999): the semantic core of the utterance is transferred from the subject, which is most often expressed by a noun, to the predicate, comparable in its “illogicality”, epathetic character, to an epithet. For example, in the phrase combination ‘blue sound’ the adjective is semantically significant rather than the noun, because the sound itself is not surprising, it is important to convey its ‘surprising blueness’. Such epithetisation in a multimodal image raises the broader problem of theme and rhema in predicative constructions (what to consider as theme and what to consider as rhema), but this problem deserves a separate development (Chebanov, Martynenko, 1999, Ch. II, §§ 3-4, Ch. III, §§ 3-4).

It is of particular significance to consider the manner in which the multimodal stimulus effect is reflected in Symbolist poetry. The expression of multimodal experience in poetic texts, particularly in the context of Symbolist poetry, is characterized by a distinctive semiotic quality. This is evident in the way transcendently given sign images of referents are conveyed. In this context, the referent is understood to encompass multimodal experience in its broadest sense. This experience is regarded as philosophically meaningful and is postulated as motivated, in other words, capable of revealing the true nature of the referent itself and the truth of its being status. French Symbolist poetry provides an exemplary case study in this regard, as it depicts the truth of the being status of things in general through the lens of the “plurality of correspondences”, or multimodality.

2.2 Synesthesia is the rule [la règle]: multimodal sensory images in the poetry of Ch. Baudelaire and A. Rimbaud

French Symbolist poets were interested in the concept of “correspondences”, which refers to the mixing of sensations across different modalities. Synesthesia represents a principal means of achieving artistry and, more broadly, symbolism in poetic texts of the era of the so-called “damned poets.” The so-called theory of “correspondences”, as postulated by Baudelaire, is generally considered to have originated in the mid-1840s. Baudelaire presents a series of individual arguments in support of his aesthetic theory, drawing on the work of various artists.

Stendhal and O. de Balzac, E. Swedenborg and I. K. Lafater, E. T. A. Hoffmann and E. Poe, E. Delacroix and C. Gys, C. M. von Weber and R. Wagner are among the figures who feature in his work. His “theory” is based on the principle of the unity of the world and the diversity of connections between its elements. This diversity gives rise to a certain intelligible correlation between ideas, sensations and images with material phenomena. This correlation enables the revelation of what is beyond the thing itself, namely its essence. The phenomenon of “correspondence” itself is declared to exist independently of human stimulus effect, but this phenomenon can be “represented” only by the observer, whose imagination is actualized either due to an inner stimulus, or due to a sensual impression from interaction with the material world and the natural world (an impression of aesthetic rather than psychophysiological nature), or due to the surrounding world itself. In such an interpretation of the “correspondence theory” one can see some parallels with alchemical transformations, in particular, with the alchemical process of *unio mentalis* (“mental union”), aimed at achieving a state of mind in which one experiences and realizes one's inseparability from the whole world, with intellect and feeling united in this experience (Poisson, 1891).

Baudelaire's programmatic poem in the context of the “theory of correspondences” is usually referred to as the sonnet “Correspondences”, written in 1861 (Baudelaire, 2017). The sonnet can even be partly described as a poetic manifesto of this so-called “theory”, as it reflects all of Baudelaire's main ideas concerning the phenomenon of “correspondences”: 1) the idea of correspondences between images constructed on the basis of auditory, visual and tactile sensations; 2) the notion of 'supernaturalism', which implies an inner meaning of phenomena lurking under the cover of the visible and tangible – what is accessible to the ordinary senses.

Comme de longs échos qui de loin se confondent
Dans une ténébreuse et profonde unité,
Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clarté,
Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se répondent.

Literally: “Like long echoes which from afar merge /In a dark and profound unity,/ Vast as the night and as the clarity,/ The perfumes, the colors and the sounds respond to each other” (translated by V. Kuznetsova).

The essence that stands beyond the thing reveals itself in correspondences or in the images of “sensations”, which are to a certain extent intelligible or, moreover, act as the basis for the fruitful activity of the intellect (the intellect as an organ of the senses – cf. Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, Book 7, parts 10”-11” – Aristotle, s. a.). However, “mind-perceived relatedness”, or correspondences, can probably be interpreted exclusively as a multimodality, since “mind-perception” is not only intuitive vision, but also its reflection, the subsequent conscious construction of correspondences on the basis of one's sensory experience. In this regard, the phenomenon called ‘correspondences’ by Baudelaire can be interpreted as a phenomenon based on the experience of multimodal rather than synesthesia proper, since this experience is inevitably associated with a cultural comprehension of those things that set the ‘plurality’ of sensations.

Baudelaire's “theory” can be interpreted as a “theory of intelligible generated insight”. This is to say that the knowledge of essence (or law) is the result not of the body experience, but also of “seeing”. It is important to note that this is not quite the experience of intellect, since the knowledge of essence is not logically deducible. Rather, it is the experience of a kind of intuition, or premonition followed by insight, clairvoyance. This can be compared with the ideas put forth by Aristotle. To some extent, Baudelaire's “theory” can be regarded as a specific approach to translating the unconscious into the conscious realm, thereby exerting a direct influence on cognitive processes and behaviour. Baudelaire's “theory” can be partly compared with those ideas about thinking that Wittgenstein would write about much later: “How can something be the shadow of a fact which doesn't exist?” (Wittgenstein, s. a.). What is “the shadow of a fact”? Nicola Masciandaro, reflecting on the nature of synesthesia, writes: “Synesthesia is phenomenally on par with the spontaneity of the absolute as the purposelessness governing all purposes and may itself be considered as a direct intimation of the paradoxically ‘endless plan’ of reality which ‘never make[s] plans, never change[s] plans’” (Masciandaro, 2018). Synesthesia (or the multimodality in the context of Baudelaire's so-called “theory”), which points to the unity of all things made according to some law, also points to what can only be seen in this endless plan of reality: in fact, it affirms only the possible as already perfect. In this sense, for her there is no “shadow of fact”, for all she “sees” is fact, an indication of the law, of its “un plans not yet made”. Our reasoning here is purely hypothetical, since there can be

many interpretations of the so-called “correspondence theory” and of Baudelaire’s poetry in general.

The understanding of synesthesia (or the multimodality of perception in the context of Baudelaire’s “theory”) as a “hint” of the “correspondence” law present in reality (which is also a universal law) is impossible, in our opinion, without mentioning the problem of “world analogy” and the phenomenon of “duplication”. Perception itself is a process of re-expression of the material world objects in the consciousness images. Re-expression is the affirmation of all experience in words, since experience itself is not enough to know about it. In this sense, only what can be perceived is real, and perceived individually (Wittgenstein, s. a.; Husserl, 2018). The idea of analogy or correspondences, for which analogy is a broader notion, involves the construction of essence hierarchy, where the First emanates in lower-order essences that duplicate themselves (e.g., the colour essence repeats itself in the smell essence which repeats itself in the sound essence, and vice versa).

It is also worthwhile to consider the poem “Les phares” (Baudelaire, 2017) by the same author. This text is also highly indicative of the manner in which poetic speech symbolism is employed. It is challenging to ascertain with certainty whether Baudelaire himself was a synesthete (the veracity of Rimbaud’s synesthesia is also open to debate). Nevertheless, this is a secondary consideration. The multimodality of Baudelaire's text is evident, situated precariously on the threshold of “conscious”, highly rational fantasy, subordinated to a specific objective – the objective of correspondence.

Delacroix, lac de sang hanté de mauvais anges,
Ombrage par un bois de sapins toujours verts,
Où, sous un ciel chagrin, des fanfares étranges
Passent, comme un soupir étoufflé de Weber.

Literally: “Delacroix: the lake of blood to which the ghosts of fallen angels flock under the shade of evergreen firs and where strange sounds like Weber's muffle sigh are heard under a sorrowful sky” (translated by Kuznetsova V.). These lines, which use only one verb (passent – give out), are extremely “substantive” (partly because French is in principle quite abstract and analytical), but also because the noun is most like a symbol, allowing us to say much without naming anything concrete. In the poetic texts of the Symbolists in general, the role of the name

increases, naming the “simultaneity” of “sensations” (and by “name” here it is appropriate to understand not only a single noun, but also a kind of indivisible word combinations, such as Baudelaire’s *le froide ténèbre*, not just a *cold darkness*, but a darkness impossible without cold; darkness makes cold perceptible, at least in Baudelaire’s poetic world). The verb also “behaves” differently from prose: it takes over the function of a noun or a name in general; its meaning is derived not from its ability to describe an action, but from its ability to state, to name an action (about the opposition of description and naming – Tondl, 1981). The verb *passer* in the poem “Les phares” states not so much the action as the very moment of this action, the transience of which, captured in the symbol, turns out to be eternal.

Furthermore, in Baudelaire's poem, proper names are revealed to be not mere symbols but emblems. Behind the pronounced name “Delacroix” lies the romanticism of his entire painting, which Baudelaire, remarkably, called “melody” (“La mélodie est l’unité dans la couleur, ou la couleur générale... c’est un ensemble où tous les effets concourent à un effet général / Melody is unity in color, or general color... it is a whole where all the effects contribute to a general effect.” – Baudelaire, s.a.). “Weber” introduces the image of romantic music, linked to the meaning of colour, complemented by green fir trees and a lake of blood. The general image of “feelings” turns out to be 'spilled' over the stanza, composed of separate and simultaneous elements of a captured moment, a “fleeting mirage”, close to *l'impression* that the Impressionists tried to convey. By symbolizing parts of speech, by likening them to nouns, Baudelaire “multiplies” images, “multiplies” meanings (here we cannot fully speak of connotations in the word as symbol : all the meanings of the symbol, all its images “exist on an equal footing”, there is nothing “additional” in it, for everything is fundamental when the manifest emanation becomes hypostasis). This is why it can be argued that the fullest expression of the multimodality is to be found in the “philosophical symbol”, which contains a potential infinity of meanings.

The so-called theory of “correspondences” probably influenced the formation of A. Rimbaud’s poetics and multimodal sensory images may be found in all his poetic work in the period from 1869 to 1871, culminating in his most famous sonnet “Voyelles” in 1872 (Rimbaud, 1972).

This refers to all of Rimbaud’s poetic texts, with the exception of his “Illuminations”, in which the rigour of classical versification is eroded and replaced by prose poems and a very early

form of ‘verilibre’, which does not allow us to speak of the significant parts of speech as Neoplatonic symbols, since at that time verilibre was not a form of Neoplatonism. At that period, verilibre, not yet fully realized as a form of poetic exposition, was too close to prose and tended towards descriptive constructions of language, including Rimbaud's).

Multimodal sensory imagery in Rimbaud's poetry has at its core three sources of multimodality:

1. apparently, synesthesia (sonnet “Voyelles” + e. g. *de noirs parfums/ black parfums, des sons bleus/ blue sounds* and etc.);
2. individuals multimodal stimulus effect, physiologically adequate (e. g. *à la claire voix d’or du timbre matinal/ to the clear golden voice of the morning timbre ; je regardai, couleur de cire./ Un petit rayon buissonnier/ I saw a small ray, wax color, bushed...*, etc.) ;
3. cultural multimodal stimulus effect, physiologically adequate (e. g. *Dans la chambre nue aux persiennes closes, / Haute et bleue, âcrement prise d’humidité/ In the bare room with closed shutters, / High and blue, acutely full of humidity...*, etc.).

It is important to note that monomodal texts can generate multimodal effects. For example, we may consider the phrase *l’azur muet/ the mute azure*, which, on the one hand, functions as a metaphor, transferring the meaning of silence to the meaning of colour. However, on the other hand, silence can also be understood as speech (cf. the linguistics of silence – Ephratt, 2022). Furthermore, silence can also be perceived as sound, resulting in an overall impression of the image that is implicitly multimodal.

Multimodal sensory experience in the poetry of Rimbaud are implicit and expressed either in “compressed”, stating phrases, or, on the contrary, are deployed in a common multimodal metaphor, which is built not lexically, but syntactically, as, for example, in the poem “Première Soirée” where the multimodal image is built thanks to the definition given by a ray of light and expressed by the apposition: *Je regardai, couleur de cire./ Un petit rayon buissonnier/ I saw a small ray, wax color, bushed..* The perception of sunlight is not only a visual sensation, as it can also be perceived with the whole body (cf. also dermo-optical perception – Makous, 1966). In

addition, by comparing the beam of light with the fly, we can say that sound has been implicitly introduced into the text – through association.

Rimbaud's polymodal sensory images are almost always connected with the meaning of colour, which either characterises the sensation of another modality, or the meaning of colour itself is 'extended' with the help of sensations of another modality. Most often these are: *colour + sound*, *colour + smell*, *colour + sensation of cold/heat*, *colour + sensation of dryness*. Color is extremely important for Rimbaud: color appears in his poetry as an independent fact of reality, which the poet in the process of his work verbally "frees" from the role of an epithet, leading to the role of a symbol or a name. This can be compared to what Malevich would do in painting much later: to release color from form. For example, the following line is indicative in this regard: *Dans la chambre nue aux persiennes closes, /Haute et bleue, âcrement prise d'humidité.../In a bare room with closed shutters, high and blue, acutely full of humidity...* "Blue" is here as an epithet of a room, it can characterize both the color of the walls, the interior as a whole, and the twilight that reigns in the room thanks to the closed shutters, however, because of the word "humidity", the color gets an additional meaning of cold, dampness, mouldiness (*âcrement* = acid). In addition, the definitions of *haute et bleue* seem to "hang in the air" separated from the word being defined by other definitions; its special meaning is punctuated. On the one hand, they are closely related to other words in the string, and on the other hand, they are absolutely independent, free.

From the perspective of verbal representation, multimodal sensory images in Rimbaud's poetry can be grouped into the following categories (A. Rimbaud's poetry was analysed between the years 1869 and 1871):

1. constructions with adjectives: *le violet humide/ the humid violet, des sons bleus/ blue sounds, de noirs parfums/ black perfumes, de longs figements violets/ long violet freezes, l'azur sonneur/ the ringing azure, l'azur muet/ the mute azure, sous les silences parfumés/ under the perfumed silences;*
2. constructions with nouns: *à la claire voix d'or du timbre matinal/ to the clear golden voice of the morning timbre, sapin du soleil/ sun fir, la blancheur du silence/ the whiteness of silence, le sang de ses sons/ the blood of its sounds;*
3. constructions with adverbs: *l'étoile a pleuré rose/ the star cried rose ;*

4. constructions with verbs: *la lumière pleut/ the light rains, danser une danse sonore/ dance a sound dance ;*
5. descriptive constructions: *les cieux glacés de rouge/the skies frozen with red ; Je regardai, couleur de cire,/ Un petit rayon buissonnier/ I saw a small ray, wax color, bushed..., mon triste coeur bave à la poupe/ my sad heart is drooling at the stern ; Dans la chambre nue aux persiennes closes, /Haute et bleue, âcrement prise d'humidité.../In a bare room with closed shutters, high and blue, acutely full of humidity...*

Rimbaud's aforementioned sonnet "Voyelles" deserves special attention. If we take the vowel as a sign of pure voice, then the multimodal sensory images in this sonnet are not only fundamentally semantic, they appear as signs of pure essence, revealing themselves as insight, as pure human voice (a cry or music).

The sonnet represents an endeavour to articulate a poetic affirmation or a poetic construction of the sign of essence. In this context, the sign of essence can be understood as the first sign, which is the name, situated at the pinnacle of a hierarchical structure. The subsequent text, or symbol, can be viewed as an emanation of essence in a more concrete form. The signs are an extremely elliptical expression of the insight seen, but an expression realized according to the law. In this way, language is reduced to nouns, as if symbolizing the insight about each vowel and its colour, while preserving its grammatical connection with other words. Given this preserved connection between the symbol (which differs fundamentally in nature from the "ordinary" denominative parts of speech) and other "non-symbolic" words, we may speak of a kind of hierarchy of law (or stages of emanations of essence) constructed by Rimbaud in the form of a poetic text. The names of the vowels and their symbolized colour in the first verse constitute a 'line' of symbols of essence, revealed by Rimbaud as a given, as an insight (i.e. it is knowledge without knowledge, knowledge without experience). The following lines, listing the essences corresponding to the vowels, are lines of images that, actualize the reader's entire cultural experience. The subsequent stage in the aforementioned hierarchy could be considered to be 'mere words', that is to say, words that are used in everyday language. However, there is no such stage in the poem, nor is it necessary, given that everyday speech exists in its own right, rather than as an opposition to poetic language (as the early formalist school wished it to be).

Instead, it can be seen as an extremely concretized form of speech, in which symbols are used to great effect.

Conclusions

Synesthesia, understood as a physiologically inadequate mixing of stimulus effect modalities, requires a certain individual system of ‘reporting’ on the lived experience – the creation of a certain introspective indexogram consisting of indexical icons. The main characteristic of such a sign is its unambiguity, reduced to an indicative-iconic role, i.e. such a sign should appear at the ‘junction’ of intension and epoch, pointing to the concreteness of the experienced sensation and at the same time resembling it. In this case, the synesthete works with signs within the receptive and/or perceptual stages of stimulus effect.

Such a method of representing synesthesia in a verbal text can probably be extended to any attempts to reliably record psychophysiological experience within the boundaries of receptive and/or perceptual stages, but in such a case the following problematic questions arise: will signs (indexical icons) expressing any individual experience of stimulus effect within the boundaries of receptive and/or perceptual stages be homonymous with signs of the same order, but used by another recipient? will such signs be externally homonymous with any other signs?

Multimodal experience, on the other hand, requires a sign representation in which additional stimulus effect modalities can be qualified as connotations of a cultural and/or individual nature. In addition, the multimodality turns out to be more fruitful for the creation of various kinds of metaphors and symbols involved in the acquisition of artistic status by a text, as opposed to synesthesia proper, which implies the unambiguity of its verbal/semiotic expression.

The poetry of French symbolism saw in the phenomenon of ‘correspondences’ the possibility of penetrating into the essence of things, which reveals itself to man in the unity of his visual, tactile and auditory sensations. Baudelaire's so-called ‘theory of correspondences’ can be qualified rather as the so-called ‘theory of multimodality’, because it is based not just on the unity of psychophysiological sensations, but also on its fundamental inclusion in culture, on the possibility of artistic transformation of this unity into a work of art, which itself becomes a symbol, potentially revealing the essence of phenomena.

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