

# **Cinematographic image and thought at the confluence of Peirce's and Deleuze's theories: Affection Image and Iconicity in focus**

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This paper presents results of the research, which subject is the relationship between cinematographic images and thought, that has been developed with support from *São Paulo State Foundation for Research Support (FAPESP)*. It aims to suggest some methodological strategies for film analysis, from the concept of image-affection, one of the three modalities of movement-image, Gilles Deleuze's concept introduced in the book

*Cinema 1 The Movement-Image*, at the confluence of Charles Sanders Peirce's theories. Therefore, one presents reflections on film analysis, about movement-image and its three divisions: perception-image, action-image, and affection-image. Following, one analyzes sequences of images in the film *The Revenant* and suggests some strategies for analyzing moving images. The relevance of such reflections is to show that film analysis is likely to go beyond both text and narrational or psychoanalytic analysis.

**Key words:** Deleuze/Peirce. Cinematographic image. Thought. Movement-image. Affection-image.

## **Introduction**

This paper, that presents result of the research about the relation between thought and cinematographic images, aims to suggest strategies for film analysis, focusing the concept of affection-image, one of the three modes of movement-image, a concept developed by Gilles Deleuze and presented in the book *Cinema 1 The movement-image*, at the confluence with Peirce's theories, mainly phenomenology and sign taxonomy.

To achieve this goal one sets out with some general aspects of both theories and procedures for film analysis; following, one addresses the concept of movement-image with an emphasis on the affection-image and availing oneself of this concept one analyzes sequences of images in the film *The Revenant*. From such analysis, one suggests strategies for analyzing moving images. In this paper, one takes some images from two long takes of the referred film.

*The Revenant* is a story with Hugh Glass, legendary character associated to The United States' expansion wars, still in the XIX century. This film is based on Michael Punke's *The Revenant*, which was published in 2002.

In the film, the character takes part in a group of fur hunters of Fort Kiowa, located near the Missouri River, presently South Dakota, which was commanded by Captain Andrew Henry. As they return from the last hunt, the group led by Henry is attacked by the Indians Arikara, whose target was their fur stock. The survivors manage to flee by boat and they take some of the fur loads. However, Glass warns the Captain that he should abandon the boat to avoid being ambushed by Indians. One of them, Fitzgerald disapproves the idea. Once in land, the group decides to hide their remaining stock and walk aside Arikara's territory, in order to avoid being attacked again. They get rid of Indians, but, one day in the morning, Hugh Glass is attacked by a female bear and gets seriously injured. Captain Henry offers a reward to anyone who is willing to carry Glass back to the Fort. Two of them decide to lag behind in order to carry him: his son Hawk, and Fitzgerald, who accepted the task because the other two ones promised to give their part in the reward to the third one who agreed to stay. However, the return was not exactly the way they had wished. Glass is abandoned and even injured he manages to make an epic regress journey. Struggling to survive, faces a brutal winter, Glass has to bear unimaginable pain, as well as Fitzgerald disloyalty. He is compelled by both his willpower and the remembrance of his family, who no longer exists.

The proliferation of images – visual representations – in different media, might justify the importance of this research, since such images have increasingly become constituters of research corpus in the most different sciences, mainly communication. Within the scope of this research, the term visual representation, according to Santaella (2011), refers to painting, illustration, photograph and cinematographic, televised and infographic image.

The understanding the relation between image and thought, in others words, to show how thought is likely to flow along with moving images, may help to understand the interpreter's cognition when he is involved in media processes and products.

Following, some reflections on film analysis.

## **Film analysis**

Concerning both language and cinema, and on film analysis, among many authors such as Metz (1971; 1972); Vanoye e Goliot-Lété (2012) e Aumont e Marie (2013), from the latter ones, one seeks guidelines to elaborate sequences of images of the film for analyzing.

Aumont and Marie (2013) comment that film analysis practically began concomitantly the appearance of cinema and currently it reaches education. From 1940 to 1950, structural analysis was predominant; in 1970's, as the studies addressing film analysis increase, several trends were designed, such as Marx's structural analysis, founded either on psychoanalysis, or in Derrida's or Lyotard's theories.

The authors understand the analysis of the film as an application, development and invention of theories and disciplines about the film, and that no universal method of analysis has been proposed so far, though one has always attempt to tabulate, comment and classify film analyses.

According to Aumont and Marie (2013), the film is an autonomous work, it engenders a text – therefrom the text analysis – that constructs meaning with narrative structures – narrational analysis – and, in visual and sound data – which requires an iconic analysis – which produces effects on the spectator, which demands a psychoanalytical analysis.

According to Aumont and Marie (2013), the text analysis founded on Umberto Eco, Roland Barthes and chiefly Christian Metz legitimated the use of fragment, a kind of sample, of anticipation, from which one can analyze the whole. The fragment must be clearly delimited and constitute a coherent and consistent excerpt, as well as be representative of the film.


As a narrative, the analysis of the film can be done via: 1) Thematic analysis, which is generalized and involves the theme of the film; 2) Content analysis, which analyzes the content and involves the formats and is processing and 3) Structure analysis of narrative, which is based on Propp's, Barthes' and Greimas' theories.

The author also address the psychoanalytic analysis, clarifying that from 1965, on under the influence of the Structuralism, the cinema began being studied as a language. Other sciences also contribute to develop new analysis strategies, particularly, by means of Althusser's rereading of Marx's theory of ideology, from which it emerges the problem that the semiotic-linguistic approaches did not take subjectivities into account. Therefrom the insertion of the psychoanalytic model, which Metz called the "second semiology of cinema". From 1980 on, in literary and artistic studies, psychoanalysis was the gist, the object, the pretext for debating. One used to consider that the text, as any other intellectual product, was molded by its producer's wish; that is, it retains the marks of its creator, so it reaches the subject who receives it.

Aumont and Marie (2013) conclude that the analysis of the film must lie in theoretical conceptions of cinema and its objectives are both to verify, invent and demonstrate theories, expliciting stylistic and poetic aspects, and revealing ideologies. The analysis compels the analyst to watch the film again and reflect on it, which characterizes an entertainment distinctive experience.

According to the same authors, such analysis can be done by applying three modalities of instruments: 1) Descriptive, which contribute to the apprehension and memorization of the film; 2) Citing, which reinforce the previous objectives and 3) Documental, which are the information from external sources. Such descriptive instruments are of three types that can be seen on the diagram (Fig. 1).

Figure 1 – Diagram for the phases of the descriptive instrument



Source: Diagram elaborated by the author from Aumont and Marie (2013).

From the confluence between Deleuze’s and Peirce’s theories, which are in the book *Cinema 1 The movement-image*, one can assure that phenomenological categories may guide the elaboration of analysis strategies to moving images. Thus, in consonance with Aumont and Marie (2013), from either a certain segmentation or in a sequence selection, such methodologies can hold either on the relation between perception-image, action-image and affection-image, or on the corroboration of which modality of movement-image preponderates on that sequence. Such movement explains how the levels of consciousness flow, how the semiosis occurs, or how the action of cinematographic images occurs.

Let us see the concept of movement-image proposed by Deleuze, emphasizing that the categories of Peirce’s phenomenology drive the divisions such modality of image.

### **About the movement-image and the affection-image/firstness/iconicity**

According to Deleuze (2009, p. 11), from Bergson’s theories, in *Matter and Memory*, the “movement, as physical reality in the external world, and the image, as psychic reality in consciousness, could no longer be opposed”, that is, such theories

have demonstrated the identity between image and movement and, more specifically, between movement-image and matter.

Deleuze (2009) clarifies that besides instant images, or immovable movement section, there are movement-images that are movable sections of duration. According to Bergson's theories, the movement is, "on one hand, that which happens between objects or parts; on the other hand, that which expresses the duration or the whole. (Deleuze, 2009, p. 27). The objects or parts within a set are denominated movable section and the "movement is established between these sections, and relates the objects or parts to the duration of a whole which changes, and thus expresses the changing of the whole in relation to the objects and is itself a *mobile section of duration*" (Deleuze 2009, p. 27).

The shot is the movement-image, that is, it is a movable section from a given duration, as it refers the movement to a changing totality. Also... "the essence of the cinematographic movement-image lies in extracting from vehicles or moving bodies the movement which is their common substance, or extracting from movements the mobility which is their essence" (Deleuze 2009, p. 44).

There are "three types of image into which the movement-image is divided: (...) perception-image; action-image and affection-image". Such division comes from the conception that perception and language distinguish bodies, qualities and actions. The body "has replaced movement with the idea of a subject which would carry it out or of an object which would submit to it, of a vehicle which would carry it" (Deleuze (2009, p.

98). The quality, by its turn, "has replaced movement with the idea of a state which persists whilst waiting for another to replace it" (Deleuze, 2009, p. 98). Finally, the action

"in precisely this sense, have already replaced movement with the idea of a provisional place towards which it is directed or that of a result that it secures" (Deleuze, 2009, p. 98). The images, in their materiality, are not conceived as bodies, but as qualities, or actions instead.

Bergson's double régime of reference of images clarifies the difference between the thing and the perception of the thing. "There is firstly a system in which each image varies for itself, and all the images act and react as a function of each other, on all their facets and in all their parts" (Deleuze, 2009, p. 102). The other is a "system where all vary principally for a single one, which receives the action of the other images on one of its facets and reacts to them on another facet" (Deleuze, 2009, p. 102).

The thing and the perception of the thing are one and the same thing, one and the same image, but related to one or other of two

systems of reference. The thing is the image as it is in itself, as it is related to all the other images to whose action it completely submits and on which it reacts immediately. But the perception of the thing is the same image related to another special image which frames it, and which only retains a partial action from it, and only reacts to it mediately. (Deleuze, 2009, p. 103-4).

However, the perception is not constituted only by subtraction. There is also action, an unpredicted response, which is only possible because by perceiving the thing, one face received a privileged excitement and the other ones were eliminated, which is “to recalling that all perception is primarily sensory-motor”. (Deleuze 2009, p. 105).

The perception-image gives place to the action-image and, according to Deleuze (2009, p. 106), one passes from one to the other, imperceptibly. According to Deleuze

(2009, p. 106), the action-image is the “second material aspect of subjectivity”. And, as perception refers the movement to “bodies” (nouns), that is, to rigid objects that will serve as movable or moved, action refers the movement to “acts” (verbs) that will be a design of either a supposed term or result.

So far one knows that the movement-image is constituted along with the perception-image, which corresponds to the first material aspect of subjectivity, the subtraction; and with the action-image, the second aspect of subjectivity, which corresponds to the virtual action of things over us and our possible action over things. But there is still the third aspect of subjectivity, the affection-image.

There is an in-between. Affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up. It surges in the center of indetermination, that is to say in the subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action. It is a coincidence of subject and object, or the way in which the subject perceives itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself ‘from the inside’ (third material aspect of subjectivity). It relates movement to a ‘quality’ as lived state (adjective). (DELEUZE, 2009, p. 106).

Perception not only retains or reflects what interests us in, but also avoids unperceiving what, in a first moment, seemed indifferent to us. The importance of that is emphasized by Deleuze (2009, p. 106-7).

There is inevitably a part of external movements that we 'absorb', that we refract, and which does not transform itself into either objects of perception or acts of the subject; rather they mark the coincidence of the subject and the object in a pure quality. This is the final avatar of the movement-image: the affection-image. It would be wrong to consider it a failure of the perception-action system. On the contrary, it is a third absolutely necessary given.

After exposing the three types of movement-image, Deleuze looks for their corresponding signs, by following the sign taxonomy of Peirce's semiotics or logic. He also associates each one of the three types of movement-image to Peirce's phenomenological categories. Within the scope of this paper, we will address the affection-image and its relations with Deleuze's designed categories and classifications.

The term affection-image requires explanations on the meanings of affection and affect. Deleuze's definition of affect, founded on Bergson, gets close, in Peirce's conception, to the logic point of view, to the monad, to a way of things to appear, which is one feature of firstness. This is because, in accordance with Deleuze (2009, p. 153), affect is indivisible, "but the singular combinations that it forms with other affects form in turn an indivisible quality, which will only be divided by changing. The affect as entity qualitatively (the 'dividual'). The affect is independent of all determinate space-time" and it "is impersonal and is distinct from every individuated state of things: it is none the less singular, and can enter into singular combinations or conjunctions with other affects". Deleuze explains that the affection-image is the close-up and the close-up is the face and in accordance with Eisenstein, "the close-up is a type of image that used to allow an affective reading of the whole film. Thus, it is not only an image as many others, but a kind of image and a component of all images". The same author also clarifies that the close-up would neither be a part of the whole, nor an object of a set in which it is inserted, but it acquires the character of an entity by being abstracted from its space-time coordinates, that is, it is something that becomes power or quality.

The affect is the entity, that is Power or Quality. It is something expressed: the affect does not exist independently of something which expresses it, although it is completely distinct from it. What expresses it is a face, or a facial equivalent (a faceified object) or, as we will see later, even a proposition. We call the set of the expressed and its expression, of the affect and the face, 'icon'. (Deleuze, 2009, p. 151).

In another moment, Deleuze retakes the notion of icon in accordance with Peircean idea.

And neither is the rain the concept of rain nor the state of a rainy time and place. It is a set of singularities which presents the rain as it is in itself, pure power or quality which combines without abstraction all possible rains and makes up the corresponding any-space-whatever. It is rain as affect, and nothing is more opposed to an abstract or general idea, although it is not actualised in an individual state of things. (Deleuze, 2009, p. 171).

However, for Deleuze, both powers and qualities may come updated, materialized in the state of things. Once they are updated, power becomes action; quality becomes 'quale' of the object; affect becomes sensation, sentiment, emotion or even pulse within a person whereas the face becomes the person's character or mask. In this case, it is not within the domain of the affection-image, but of the action-image instead. However, even updated, they do not lose the power to generate effects of pure quality or power, from Peircean perspective.

According to Deleuze (2009, p. 153), "the affection-images, in their strict sense, address only firstness".

Deleuze (2009, p. 152) mentions that for any classification of images and signs, Peirce used to distinguish between two types of images that he called "'Firstling' and 'Secondariness'". Within the context of our research, we not use the term *firstling*<sup>1</sup>, as Deleuze does, for the first category of Peirce's phenomenology, but "firstness". According to Peirce's perspective, phenomenology "collects and studies the types of elements that are present in the phenomenon" (CP 1.186). It is not a science of reality; it is a *quasi-science* that seeks the specificities of the phenomenon, which remains restricted to their appearance. To stay in this level, Peirce emphasizes that it is necessary to construct mental eyes. It means that we need look at the phenomenon and verify "which are the characteristics that are never absent in it, independently on this phenomenon either be something that the external experience imposes to our attention, or be it the wildest dream, or one of the most abstract and general conclusions of science" (CP 5.41). Let us see how the French philosopher explains two of the categories: firstness and secondness.

Concerning firstness, though considering that Peirce's examples were strange, the French philosopher makes statements about firstness, which are in accordance with Peirce's explanations.

Firstness is thus the category of the Possible: it gives a proper consistency to the possible, it expresses the possible without actualising it, whilst making it a complete mode. Now, this is



exactly what the affection-image is: it is quality or power, it is potentiality considered for itself as expressed. (Deleuze, 2009, p. 152).

Deleuze relates firstness to conscience, which also corresponds to conscience of quality or of firstness, such as proposed by Peirce. “If you like, it is an immediate and instantaneous consciousness, such as is implied by every real consciousness which is itself never immediate nor instantaneous. It is not a sensation, a feeling, an idea, but the quality of a possible sensation, feeling or idea” (Deleuze, 2009, p. 152).

So Deleuze (2009, p. 152) concludes that “is exactly what the affection-image is; it is quality or power, it is potentiality considered for itself as expressed. The corresponding sign is therefore expression, not actualization.”

Let us see how the affection-image is constituted within the selected sequenceplans, in the film *The Revenant*.

### **The possible preponderance of the affection-image in *The Revenant***

Let us take as examples two sequences of images from the film *The Revenant*. It is a 156-minute film, produced in 2015, in which the long take predominate. Following some images of one of those sequence-plans, in the figures 1 to 4.

Figure 1 – Hugh Glass acting



Source: Computer print screen

In this sequence, Hugh Glass, the legendary explorer of the American territory, who acts as a guide to American hunters, is acting (Fig 1). When his face appears on

the screen, the spectator can note his brutal effort to deprive the animal from its entrails (Fig.2).

Figure 2 – The brutal force expressed on the face



Source: Computer print screen

When the face of the character takes the scene, one perceives a play of colors, forms and sounds that can incite the spectator to contemplate the image. The effort, then present in the previous images, seems diluted by the heat of the animal's body, by the lines and marks of the face mixed with snowflakes and red color rags, that to create a play with the colors red and white (Fig. 3).

Figure 3 – A play with red and white



Source: Computer print screen

Following, the image that culminates in a face (Fig. 3), can predominate as an affection-image. Deleuze (2009, p. 137-8) clarifies that for Bergson affection is a “motor tendency on a sensitive nerve”, that is, “a series of micro-movements on an immobilized plate of nerve”.

When a part of the body has had to sacrifice most of its motoricity in order to become the support for organs of reception, the principal feature of these will now only be tendencies to movement or micro-movements which are capable of entering into intensive series, for a single organ or from one organ to the other. The moving body has lost its movement of extension, and movement has become movement of expression. It is this combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements which constitutes the affect. But is this not the same as a Face itself? (Deleuze, 2009, p. 138).

Thus, the face “is this organ-carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed most of its global mobility and which gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny local movements which the rest of the body usually keeps hidden” (Deleuze, 2009, p. 138). Something acquires the character of face when presents two poles: a reflective surface and intensive micro-movements. In the cinema, the close-up does not address the face or submits itself to it, that is, “there is no close-up of the face, the face is in itself close-up, the close-up is by itself face and both are affect, affection-image” (DELEUZE 2009, p. 138).

Proceeding with the sequence of images, the next image (Fig. 4) gives place to a profusion of qualitative aspects and thus the affection-image possibly emerges.

Figure 4 – White surface and black spots



Source: Computer print screen

A mixture of colors, forms, textures, accompanied by sounds, explodes in the screen. Irregular black forms over a smooth area, red spots over a white coarse

surface, a heap of reddish viscous folds and dark hard stems. Ambiguity. Silence. Pause. A play of qualitative aspects dances slowly over the screen and can make the viewer remain in a state of contemplation and incites him to conjecture. No brutal action any longer. Affection-image is the field of firstness, of the consciousness of quality. The effects provoked on the interpreter, the spectator by the screen, are the qualities of sentiment related to red, white and black colors, to the smooth, coarse and viscous textures, to the irregular and round forms, to the sounds of silence, of the emptiness, finally, the combination of all these aspects.

The face (Fig. 3) shows a reflexive or reflecting face, because “the features remain grouped under the domination of a thought which is fixed or terrible, but immutable and without becoming, in a way eternal” (Deleuze, 2009, p. 141). The reflexive face “expresses a pure Quality, that is to say a ‘something’ common to several objects of different kinds” (Deleuze, 2009, p. 142).

However, we have not yet reached the most profound aspect of the reflectionface. Mental reflection is undoubtedly the process by which one thinks of something. But it is cinematographically accompanied by a more radical reflection expressing a pure quality, which is common to several different things (the object which carries it, the body which submits to it, the idea which represents it, the face which has this idea. . .). (Deleuze, 2009, p. 141).

The other (Fig. 4) is an intensive face, because “expresses a pure Power - that is to say, is defined by a series which carries us from one quality to another” (Deleuze, 2009, p. 142).

Such image also configures the dispositive: “a white wall/black hole system” (DELEUZE, 2012, p. 36). In this case, such abstract machine works in other thing that is not a (human) face. The great amount of black spots – eyes – that slide over the white wall (a snow-covered surface) amplifies the surface over which the spectator’s eye slides, that is, such eyes enhance the force of image capturing. Black eyes that guide the spectator to confirm that his eyes are useless... such dispositive allows us to gain speed, without moving. Deleuze clarifies that the black holes allow not to see the eyes any longer, not to look at the eyes any longer, but to cross them swimming, closing one’s eyes and to make the body move at a higher and higher speed.

Such image constitutes a face, but like the one frontally seen, “seen by a subject who does not properly see, instead, he is engulfed by the black holes” (DELEUZE 2012, p. 57).

In a certain way, in some moments, the mentioned qualitative aspects become clues, vestiges and marks of the real. The red color refers to blood; white, to snow and the irregular contour covered by black spots alludes to the body of a horse. However, are not the clues that guide the spectator’s thought. This is realized by the qualities of

sentiment related to qualitative aspects – redness, whiteness and the form of the dispositive white wall/black circles - that predominate and lead the spectator to contemplation, a state that does not establish a bond with time and space.

On the other hand, all the aspects culturally shared and related to the qualitative and singular mentioned aspects contribute to reinforce the effects of image. The ambiguity that reigns in the image comes with such clashes.

According to Chevalier and Gheerbrant (2008, p. 944), redness is the fundamental symbol of the principle of life and since it is dark red, it “is nocturnal, female, secret and, in last analysis, centripetal; it represents not the expression, but the mystery of living”. Among other meanings, according to the same authors, when it appears spread, the color dark red means death. Therefore, the red color brings the clash between life and death. Out of their place, heaped and viscous, the entrails establish a counterpoint to the dark and firm interweaves; one of them addresses the interior of the body, to the body, to the heat; the other one, addresses the mind as a neural web. Body and mind separated, in a clash. The black and the white of the spots bring a new clash. According to Chevalier and Gheerbrant (2008), black symbolizes both savageness and killing instinct and the white symbolizes the color of the passage, death and rebirth. Finally, according to the same authors, the horse symbolizes life, continuity; it relinks the opposite, death and life, passion and action, day and night. Here, by appearing lifeless, its linking potentiality is weakened, which reinforces the already given ambiguity.

In the scene, there is the sound of wind, among others, which leads the spectator to instability, to inconstancy, as well as to the possibility of living, of rebirth, since that, according to Chevalier and Gheerbrant (2008, p. 935), “wind is also synonym to blow and, therefore, of spirit, of spiritual influx of heavenly origin”.

An image that causes instability and apprehension in conflict to the sense of welcoming and warmth, which comes along with the idea of a body protected by an animal’s venter, because the venter “symbolizes mother, analogous to cave, though reflecting particularly a necessity of tenderness and protection”. The venter shows itself up as a refuge.

There is also the effect of a fog that covers or permeates the image, which contributes to set an ambiance of instability, of chaos. It because in accordance with

Chevalier and Gheerbrant (2008, p. 634), the fog “symbolizes one phase of evolution: when the forms are still undistinguishable, or when the antique forms that have been disappearing have not been substituted by new precise forms yet”.

Such symbolic aspects, culturally shared, impregnate both the image and the subject’s collateral experience, which, independently on the interpretative process to come up, contribute to set such ambiance of instability, of indetermination, and of

eminent life, which paralyzes the spectator and contributes to keep on him in a contemplative state.

Therefore, the image (Fig. 4) can preponderate as affection-image. In accordance with the taxonomy elaborated by Peirce, the image becomes a rhematic iconic qualisign. The image becomes qualisign because the qualitative aspects of the image predominate in the semiosis; iconic comes by the power of suggesting the object of the sign and the rhematic effect comes by setting on the spectator to the level of conscience of quality, as someone who is in a contemplation state. The image - something faceified (Fig. 4) -, displays a play between the predominance of secondness and firstness, a slow game between the effects of verification and contemplation.

Such sequence of images constructs both a duration and an effective time, as result of alternation between secondness and firstness. The image stays for a long time on the screen and impregnates the spectator more intensively with qualities of sentiment. For such things to persist and the spectator's thought may be guide by images, new similar sequences repeat the experience.

In another long take, the water takes over the scene. The moving water manifests all its fury, drags the character and slowly weakens when it contours the rock as a light beam. This sequence can be saw in figures 5 to 8. There are two predominate qualitative aspects: the water movement and the blue color.

Figure 5 – The water sculpting the rock



Source: Computer print screen

Figure 6 – The water engulfing the body



Source: Computer print screen

Figure 7 – Face/Landscape 1



Source: Computer print screen

Figure 8 – Face/Landscape 2



Source: Computer print screen

In the sequence of images one finds a face sculpted and chinked by water (Fig. 5); the movement that whitens water – like snowflakes – white wall, landscape – which spots a black point, a configuring face (Fig. 6); landscape that slowly leads the spectator to the black hole, from resting to moving, another water-sculpted face (Fig. 7). The movement, for its turn, halts when the black spot invades the screen, centered, heavy and static (Fig.

8). The spectator flows as water moves. Thus, the spectator's consciousness level modifies from secondness, which is established by the movement water, to firstness, which comes along with the landscape, with the white wall that predominates on the faceified thing.

The symbolic aspects related to water, for their turn, can contribute to intensify the rhematic effects. According to Chevalier and Gheerbrant (2008, p. 15):

Water, as an undifferentiated mass, representing the infinity of the possible, contains all the virtual, all the informal, the germ of germs, all the promises of development, but also all the threats of reabsorption. Dive in the water and get out of it without being totally dissolved, saved by a symbolic death, is returning to one's origins; recharging oneself in an immense energy reservoir from which to drink a new strength: an ephemeral phase of regression and disintegration, which conditions a new progressive phase of reintegration and regeneration.

Thus, the black spot that emerges on the surface, the central point of concentric waves that are delineated on the surface (Fig. 8) signalizes a new phase in the character's life, a phase in which the living pulse is more powerful. Overcome life.

The whitish shades of the moving water falls begins crashing against rocks. One of them, an active principle; the other one, a symbol of immobility, of immutability. On the other hand, according to Chevalier and Gheerbrant (2008, p. 782), in the "Old Testament, the rock is a symbol of Jehova's strength".

Concerning color, it is worth emphasizing that the bluish shade that impregnates the images contributes to hold the spectator in a contemplation state. With the blue color the "eyes dive without facing any stymie, straying to the infinite, as being before a perpetual color vanishing" (Chevalier; Gheerbrant, 2008, p. 107) and when it is applied to an object, it "soothes the forms, opening and dissolving them". [...] As it is itself immaterial, blue color dematerializes everything it impregnates. It is the way to infinite, where the real becomes imaginary" (Chevalier; Gheerbrant, 2008, p. 107).



This sequence, because of the qualitative aspects described, can predominate as affection-image. In Peirce's perspective, is the same that to say that the qualitative elements command the action of these images, this is, they prevail as rhematic iconic qualisign, or rhematic iconic sinsigns.

### **What one infers from such analyses...**

It's necessary to reaffirm the potentiality of images, in which the qualitative aspects preponderate over the indexical aspects, or over the ones that relate the spectator to the real, or even, over the ones that are culturally shared, in order to elicit contemplation. Such aspects allow the field of secondness to be soothed, so that firstness can predominate. This leads us to highlight the importance of categories to elaboration of the concept of movement-image, in its three modalities.

The qualitative tissue set by the affection-images contributes to guide the thought, the cognition. Again, one searches contributions from Peirce's ideas, specifically in *The Law of Mind*, an article that was published in 1892, which results from Peirce's analyses of mental phenomena, in the perspective of logic. From Peirce's explanations (1998), one can conjecture that by putting the interpreter within the field of firstness, in a contemplation state, or, by setting the relative conscienceness to such category, the qualities of sentiment preponderate. Therewith, it is constituted a qualitative tissue in one's mind, as innumerable qualities of sentiment tend to be updated; they remain as potentialities. Thus, general ideas become potentially present in the semiosis, because they are its translators. That is, such qualitative tissue is propitious to cognition.

Thus, as strategies, availing oneself of Aumont and Marie's proposal (2013), one can select a series of sequences in which the affection-images prevail, since they are the leading elements, via qualities of sentiment, which emerge along with qualitative aspects that are set in movement; the spectator's reflections.

### **Final statements**

Considering that, cinematographic images are composed by three modalities: perception-image, action-image and affection-image, one of the film analysis strategies constitutes, in a first attempt to sketch such strategies, try to elucidate what modality of the movement-image prevail in the film. With this we also one obtains an answer to the preponderance both of a determined level of consciousness

and, consequently, of a certain effect, or some possible interpretants for the cinematographic image.

To complete the analysis of the film *The Revenant*, it seems reasonable to select other sequences and to verify how the action-images establish a play with the affection-images, as well as to explain the common aspects to them, since they will conduce the semiosis.

The analyses that have been done reveal how the affection-image guides the spectator's constructed meanings for the film as a whole, to the extent that it is almost irrelevant whether the character is a North-American explorer struggling to survive and carry out his plan... The meanings are constructed by the affection-images that elicit sensations, emotions... that allows the action of such cinematographic images continues, that the semiosis continues.

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