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DOI 10.33234/SSR.14.3
Paul Ryder
University of New South Wales
Abstract
The European summer of 1944 saw what is arguably the greatest deception wrought through deliberate miscommunication. Operation
Fortitude focussed on convincing the Nazis that the invasion of Europe would come not at Normandy but further north at the Pas-de-Calais. Seeing the enemy almost completely wrong-footed, Fortitude remains the most devastating deception in the history of warfare. It is also a campaign that teaches us a great deal about the internal dynamics and semiotics of strategy more generally. Accordingly, I propose that Operation Fortitude speaks profoundly to the principle of polysemy and to the related idea that, in competitive fields, strategic design may see to it that we are deceived into misreading tactics in relation to their informing concepts. Directly related to the above, the paper proposes that, since it is always founded upon a more or less difficult-to-fathom conceptual core, all strategy inevitably deceives—and that the question of deception is merely a matter of degree. Further to the above, I also argue that Operation Fortitude teaches us that, at its heart, good strategy seldom depends upon a singular concept but upon several cooperating abstractions. The paper’s final substantive point is that Operation Fortitude reminds us that in order to think productively about strategy, it pays to bear in mind the following military principle: at its most effective, strategy is a unique and exquisitely synergistic coupling of objectives, concepts, and (dehabitualised) tactics.
In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.
Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister